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lose the body of tradition and law that
defines our homeland.
The editors cover an ambitious amount
of ground for such a slim volume, and
the space available does not permit a
variety of perspectives on each topic.
An examination into the U.S. govern-
ment’s reactions to racial and political
unrest at home after the McCarthy era,
for instance, would have been welcome.
However, the book’s essays seem se-
lected to provoke the reader to explore
their subjects more deeply, and the con-
tributions are uniformly well sup-
ported. The citations provide ample
direction for readers wishing to explore
on their own the issues presented.
RANDY L. UNGER
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
Homeland Defense & American Security Affairs
Cann, John P. Brown Waters of Africa: Portuguese
Riverine Warfare, 1961–1974. St. Petersburg, Fla.:
Hailer, 2007. 248pp. $29.99
Counterinsurgency warfare is what used
to be called “colonial warfare.” Al-
though the association might make
some people uncomfortable—Ameri-
cans perhaps more than most, given
their aversion to colonialism—much of
the strategic intent and many of the tac-
tics, techniques, and procedures of
modern counterinsurgency derive di-
rectly from the colonial wars and police
actions of the past.
In some respects riverine warfare suf-
fers from the taint of colonialism more
than do other aspects of counterinsur-
gency, a prejudice that is currently rein-
forced by the apparent trend for
insurgents who worry the West to cen-
ter their operations in urban rather
than rural environments and to seek
sanctuary in the anonymity of cities
rather than remote countrysides. In
many parts of the world, however,
rivers remain the principal transport
routes, and their control remains of
fundamental importance to the success
or failure of insurgent movements.
The last great colonial empire in Africa
was Portuguese, and a history of the
riverine campaigns fought in its defense
between 1961 and 1974 is long overdue.
John P. Cann, a retired Marine Corps
University professor with a doctorate in
African counterinsurgency from King’s
College London, shows that the Portu-
guese took what they could from British
and, particularly, French experiences
and adapted it to suit their particular
circumstances and the often limited re-
sources at their disposal.
After placing the total effort in the stra-
tegic context of the Cold War, the his-
torical context of twentieth-century
Portuguese history, and the contempo-
raneous political context of the regime
of António de Oliveira Salazar, Cann
demonstrates how the Portuguese navy
and naval infantry, the fuzileiros, fought
an effective campaign in three diverse
theaters: on the rivers of Angola; on the
Rovuma River and Lake Niassa in Mo-
zambique; and among the estuaries,
deltas, and swamp forests of the West
African enclave of Bissau.
Cann recounts with balance and clarity
the lessons the Portuguese drew from
the experience. Insurgency is political
war where the center of gravity is the
population. Consequently, the naval
role differs very little from that of the
army. The essence is to develop and
maintain contact with the civilian pop-
ulation so close and regular that it often
amounts to “armed social work.”
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Presence—achieved by living, and con-
ducting river and foot patrols, among
local people to gain their trust and to
build sound knowledge about the en-
emy—is equally important, as is, at the
same time, keeping the insurgents off
balance through the use of deception
and irregular patrol patterns, a combi-
nation the Portuguese were able to
achieve because units were deployed in
two-year cycles.
The Portuguese also learned the impor-
tance of joint effort. Wherever the navy
and army disagreed and failed to oper-
ate together, which happened in Bissau
particularly, results were affected. Also,
that no campaign could be isolated
from the wider political context was a
lesson that became painfully apparent
following a militarily successful but po-
litically damaging raid on Conakry, the
capital of Guinea, to free hostages and
destroy insurgent sanctuaries.
In short, all practitioners and students
of riverine warfare will be grateful that
John P. Cann has written such an excel-
lent account.
MARTIN N. MURPHY
Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies
Shrivenham, England
Smith, Perry M., and Daniel M. Gerstein. Assign-
ment Pentagon: How to Excel in a Bureaucracy. 4th
ed. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007.
273pp. $22.95
For this, the fourth edition of his well
received book, Major General Perry M.
Smith, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), has added
a coauthor, Colonel Daniel M. Gerstein,
U.S. Army (Ret.). Colonel Gerstein
served for twenty-six years in combat,
peace, and humanitarian operations.
He also served in the Pentagon for al-
most ten years in senior advisory and
leadership roles.
This edition has been expanded into
sixteen chapters, each adding consider-
able value to the publication. One of
the more interesting and vital chapters
for properly grasping the workings of
“the building” is devoted to “under-
standing the process.” This chapter suc-
cinctly describes the Joint Strategic
Planning System (JSPS), the Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPBS), and the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC). These enti-
ties are extremely complex by their very
natures, but it is vital to understand
how they all fit together for our na-
tion’s defense. The authors do a superb
job of simplifying these systems, giving
additional references for in-depth
understanding.
Smith and Gerstein also briefly address
military ethics, touching upon military
interaction with Congress and ethics
within the executive branch. Problems
are identified and solutions are sug-
gested, but it is beyond the scope and
intention of this book to address these
issues other than superficially. The
reader should already be educated re-
garding ethics and ethical behavior; this
chapter serves simply to remind us that
doing the “right thing” continues to be
difficult at times.
As with the earlier editions, the present
one addresses many day-to-day busi-
ness elements related to serving at the
Pentagon. The book allows the reader,
whether a newly assigned military
member or civilian, to obtain a prelimi-
nary understanding of the complex na-
ture of this intense mixture of military
and civilian bureaucracies.
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